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ABSTRACT 
This paper delineates and discusses the overall theoretical trajectory of Hans Lindahl’s work 
Fault Lines of Globalization. Furthermore, through a strategy of joint thinking – or dialogue – 
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and more accurate inspection. 
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The Editorial Board of Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics has decided to devote the 
Symposium-section of the current Issue to Hans Lindahl’s Fault Lines of Globaliza-
tion. Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (Oxford University Press 2013).1 
This monograph represents a path-breaking work both in the realm of a general 
theory of law as well as in the ambit of the socio-, politico- and legal-philosophical 
studies questioning the structure and the destinies of institutional orders in a glob-
al setting. The book has already started infiltrating the international debate by 
raising numerous discussions,2 and we are convinced it is destined to gain even 
broader resonance in the longer run.  
                                           
1 Henceforth cited as FLG, followed by page number. 
2 The book has already been object of discussion in seminars and presentation events at the fol-
lowing universities: Warwick, Exeter, London/Birkbeck, Weimar (in 2013); Ghent, Catanzaro, 
Hamburg, London/Westminster, Glasgow, Helsinki, Bogotà, Napoli, Montreal/McGill, Yale (in 
2014). A presentation is already planned in Frankfurt a.M. for January 2015. Besides our review 
section, other discussions of the book have been organized by the following journals: Contempo-
rary Political Theory (2015), edited by Andrew Schaap and with contributions by David Owen 
(Southampton, UK) and James Ingram (McMaster, Canada); Jurisprudence (2015), with contri-
butions by Panu Minkkinen (Helsinki), Emmanuel Melissaris (LSE, London), Scott Veitch 
(Hong Kong) and Massimo La Torre (Catanzaro/Hull). A review of FLG is also scheduled to ap-
pear in Political Theory.     
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With the wide range of responses to the book gathered hereafter – affirmative 
or critical as they are –, our Journal not only aims to deliver further proof of the 
importance of the text, but also wishes to underscore particularly its richness and 
influence in terms of its cross-disciplinary reach.   
It is no light endeavour to present, in the space of an introduction, the dense, 
multi-perspectival and challenging thrust Lindahl’s work brings to the fore, while 
trying at the same time not to repeat or slightly readjust the (extraordinarily well 
argued) points, remarks and critiques our contributors – Emilios Christodoulidis 
(Glasgow), Fabio Ciaramelli  (Catania), Martin Loughlin (London School of Eco-
nomics), Sofia Näsström (Uppsala), Stefan Rummens (Leuven), and Neil Walker 
(Edinburgh) – have raised in their own papers. Thus, in order to avoid such a risk, 
instead of providing an introductory contribution to the work, I have decided to 
leave it to a kind of joint thinking – or dialogue – with the author, with the task of 
displaying the main aspects of his own line of thought. Adopting this strategy will 
– I hope – hit a double target. On the one hand, it will give the reader the oppor-
tunity to better grasp some aspects and features of the author’s philosophical 
background, otherwise left mostly unexpressed or in latency in his book. On the 
other, it will give the author the space to more accurately flesh out some crucial 
passages which he believes, at this point, need be more clearly unfolded or more 
accurately reasserted. 
Before initiating the announced dialogue, let me however begin by delineating 
the overall trajectory of the work, so as to set the discussion in the right frame.  
The book revolves around a major thesis that gives rise to a large range of im-
plications while simultaneously opposing some widely endorsed assumptions repre-
senting the mainstream position in the fields of legal and political studies. In fact, 
unlike many widely shared views, Lindahl’s mainstay is that any kind of politico-
legal order, far from displaying its structural core in its mere normative articula-
tion – which can be, then, easily brought into formalized and mechanized proce-
dures – should be primarily understood as the result of a kind of joint action, i.e. as 
an acting together which institutes and shapes collective behaviour. By being con-
stitutively mediated by authorities, such an order also implies, therefore, a norma-
tive setting, which establishes in legal terms the subjective, material, spatial, and 
temporal coordinates of this behaviour. It establishes, in other words, who ought 
to do what, where, and when.  
From this assumption, however, one should not too easily and rapidly draw 
the wrong impression that, for Lindahl, normativity becomes all of the sudden a 
merely secondary feature of legal orders. Far from aiming at this simplistic out-
come, his argument shows a finer and more far-reaching perspective. He contends, 
in fact, not that the normative aspect is simply derivative, but rather that this as-
pect, though undoubtedly essential for any legal order, represents a complex phe-
nomenon, which conveys its full structural configuration only if one considers its 
A-Legality: Journey to the Borders of Law. In Dialogue with Hans Lindahl 
 
921 
 
constitutive provenance rooted in the same collective action it is meant to regu-
late. And what one discovers by looking at this genealogical aspect is the following 
fundamental state of affairs: all normative orders, legal or otherwise, being the 
very derivation of the contingent and plural action of their own institution, cannot 
but bear throughout their life the mark of finitude. Otherwise said: orders, insofar 
as instituted, can never relinquish or sublimate the originary fact that they are the 
result of an instituting process articulating itself in a setting of boundaries which 
inevitably includes something by excluding something else.  
The implications of this assumption for the structure and functioning of legal 
orders are decisive and manifold – and the entire book may be understood as the 
multi-perspectival attempt to depict and follow the various trajectories of these 
implications up to their deepest consequences.  
On closer inspection, there are three main implications, according to Lindahl, 
which follow from the fact that all legal orders are structurally limited or – better 
said – de-fined by boundaries. In the first place, legal orders are to be considered as 
never posited once and for all, but, on the contrary, as always subject to the possi-
ble questioning of their own configuration, which takes place exactly along the 
margins of their delimitation (a). Secondly, the articulation and transformation of 
legal orders can be grasped and explained only through a careful topological in-
spection illustrating the forms in which the dynamic of boundaries emerges and 
functions (b). Thirdly, no universalizing pretension, regardless of the guise such a 
claim may assume – be it globalization, mondialisation, cosmopolitanism, super-
national governance, or even the acclaimed universality of human rights – can ever 
overcome the limitedness and boundedness constitutive of legal orders (c).  
(a) As concerns the first line of implications, Lindahl thoroughly analyzes the 
feature of contingency constitutive of any imaginable legal order by connecting it to 
its political insurgence. In extremely simplified terms, what the author conveys 
here is the fundamental fact that all orders are and will always remain insuperably 
contingent because they are none other than the reflections of always historical 
and creative joint action – the action of a putative We – which institutes them. No 
possible normative mechanism or proceduralization will ever be sufficiently capa-
cious to fully cover over or sublimate, in terms of an instituted stabilization, such a 
dynamical articulation of the instituting We. And this immediately implies: con-
tingent orders, insofar as limited, will always be transformable.  
(b) As a consequence of this, a second line of implications  emerges: if legal or-
ders are irreducibly contingent, limited, and modifiable, then this calls for a more 
precise specification by addressing the following questions: in which sense precisely 
are legal orders limited? And in which sense are legal orders transformable? 
Lindahl answers these questions by showing two things: first, the limitedness of 
any given order specifically means limitedness in membership, content, space, and 
time – as we have already stated above: an order can be such only if it establishes 
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who ought to do what, where, and when. Second, the transformation of any given 
order takes place exactly under the condition that a demand for its modification 
takes place, thereby calling it into question and intimating a new organization or 
shaping of its extant boundaries (along with the collective behaviour therein con-
tained). According to Lindahl, however, the fundamental element that emerges 
here is represented by the fact that such a demand can by no means be seized if one 
simply remains within the legal/illegal bi-partition typical of the way in which le-
gal orders are usually conceived. Indeed, a demand for transformation cannot be 
simply understood as only “within” the order, or only “outside” it. Instead – as the 
author puts it –, this demand is to be conceived of as “a-legal”, i.e. as deriving 
from a normative claim that registers in the legal order as legal or illegal (and is in 
that sense “inside” the order), yet also questions both poles of the distinction be-
tween the legal and illegal (and is in that sense “outside” it), thereby opening up 
possibilities of the legal order which it could realize while also intimating possibili-
ties that lie beyond its scope of transformation.  Borrowing an extremely clarifying 
passage of the book:  
The ‘il’ of ‘illegality’ speaks to a privative form of legal order: legal disor-
der. By contrast, the ‘a’ of a legality is not privative, or in any case not only 
privative: a-legal behaviour (also) intimates another legal order. [. . .] Not the 
reaffirmation of boundaries, as drawn by a given legal order for a certain situa-
tion, but their questioning is at stake in a-legality. Accordingly, a-legality, like 
illegality, reveals that legal boundaries govern behaviour and also, conversely, 
that legal boundaries depend on behaviour. But if the qualification of an act as 
illegal serves to reaffirm the primacy of boundaries over behaviour, a-legality 
primarily reveals the capacity of behaviour to draw boundaries otherwise. 
(FLG, p. 37) 
 Simultaneously, given the central role that the transgression of boundaries 
plays for the understanding of the phenomenon of a legal order’s alteration, an ac-
curate phenomenological inquiry becomes necessary for Lindahl,  such that one 
cannot be theoretically appeased by the simple attestation that the challenge of an 
order generally leads to its modification. The liminal dynamic taking place along 
the borders of order requires, instead, a careful analysis and differentiation of its 
various forms of insurgence – and this exactly according to the ways and intensi-
ties with which boundaries are accessed and challenged. This gives rise, in 
Lindahl’s meditation, to a structural  differentiation of how boundaries manifest 
themselves when transgressed. According to this differentiation, boundaries appear 
as “limits” and as “fault lines”. I restrict myself here only to naming this distinc-
tion, leaving to the discussion with the author – and, of course, also to the contri-
butions of our discussants – their more precise qualification and problematic con-
sideration. The important element I would like to further emphasize is, however, 
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the fact that, according to Lindahl, a legal order’s boundaries, regardless the forms 
through which they may manifest themselves or be challenged, can never be sur-
passed or incorporated into a total formation, which either sets or even erases them 
permanently: an inside and an outside, in the sense noted above, are a constitutive 
feature of legal orders as such.  
(c) And this leads immediately to the third line of Lindahl’s considerations: 
universality, globality, totality, in their common claim to the possibility of finally 
overcoming the inside/outside distinction, represent no actual possibility for any 
imaginable politico-legal order. 
As one can easily grasp, Lindahl’s phenomenological thrust is called here to 
display all its deconstructive potentiality and efficacy, especially in opposition to 
the current broadly endorsed assumption in political and legal studies, according to 
which, in a global setting, we are nowadays moving towards a configuration of or-
der without external boundaries. Against this more or less unquestioned assump-
tion, Lindahl’s analysis, which scrutinizes several normative orders – such as clas-
sical international law, the current form of a super-national governance inspired by 
a lex mercatoria model, the European Union legal frame, cyber law, and even the 
global regimes of human rights –, seeks to show how the universal claim therein 
contained remains exactly what it is, i.e. only a purported claim, which cannot be 
realized; or better: which can claim realization only by hiding its contingent and 
rooted provenance. 
Drawing on all of these elements, we can now begin our discussion with the au-
thor, having sufficient elements at hand to realize how high is the stake of his dis-
course, and how challenging his perspective can be within the current political and 
legal international debate.  
 
Ferdinando Menga [FM]: Professor Lindahl, thank you very much for having 
accepted to put your work to the proof of this joint assessment and as a theme of 
this introductory conversation. 
To begin with, I would like to start by thematizing one of the more striking el-
ements of your work, which immediately captures the attention of the reader: You 
clearly insert your work in the trajectory of legal studies, while simultaneously 
questioning one of its traditional leitmotifs, i.e. the priority of the normative ele-
ment. You contend, in fact, that to thoroughly seize the structure and functioning 
of legal orders one should not look only, or even immediately, at its normative ar-
ticulation, but rather and much more at its behavioural aspect, rooted in the di-
mension of shared action. This claim provokes a powerful rupture or, at least, an 
evident shift in the way legal theories usually conceive of the juridical order.  
To be sure, at the outset of your work, in stressing the centrality of the behav-
ioural aspect as opposed to the normative one, you underline extremely well how 
this kind of consideration is by no means merely external, but rather already at 
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work within the traditional line of the legal discourse, even though only in terms of 
an underdeveloped possibility (cf. pp. 16 ff). I refer here, for instance, to the pas-
sage in which you address Hans Kelsen’s work. You show that although his per-
spective ably takes into account the importance of “human behaviour” for legal 
orders,3 yet you nevertheless prefer to perform a decisive shift by mainly stressing 
the normative unity of legal orders from the perspective of their addressees, and 
the pre-eminence of the related semantics of validity. Such a strategy of internal 
excavation of the hidden resources of the legal tradition is interesting and a proof 
of hermeneutical mastery. However, one could raise at least a couple of questions 
or critical considerations – if you wish – to this strategy. One could ask why, in-
deed, if the behavioural aspect is constitutive as you claim, it never managed to 
make the big leap from the background to the proscenium of the traditional juridi-
cal discourse. Furthermore, one may also wonder, accordingly, whether the great 
stress you put on behaviour and joint action, more than hitting the very core of 
the “legal” within the structure of orders, more pointedly concerns its “political” 
articulation. Perhaps, a possible way in which you could start clarifying these 
points, is to tell us also a bit more about the way in which this central idea of your 
work has emerged in your legal-philosophical line of thinking. 
 
Hans Lindahl [HL]: It is indeed the case that FLG argues for a different ap-
proach to the concept of legal order, one in which its boundaries are given pride of 
place. This is not particularly odd, if one considers that a legal order regulates—
orders—behavior by setting the boundaries that establish who ought to do what, 
where, and when. But if this is so palpably obvious, why, as you rightly ask, has 
an enquiry into the internal connection between legal orders and boundaries not 
been at the core of contemporary legal (and political) theory? The answer, it seems 
to me, is that the contemporary debate is dominated by what is traditionally 
called the “identity” question about law, namely, the question what identifies law 
as a distinctive normative order and thereby differentiates it from other normative 
orders, e.g. morality. So, for example, the bitter and protracted debate between le-
gal positivism and normative theories of law (including but not limited to natural 
law, social contract, and discourse theories of law), turns on this issue. 
As a result, a second question has been largely marginalized, and which is tra-
ditionally called the “individuation” question, namely, the question concerning the 
conditions that allow of picking out a given legal order as, say, the “Italian” legal 
order, lex mercatoria, international law, or whatever. This question is viewed as be-
ing of secondary importance and, as such, one which can be safely passed on to le-
gal sociology and other disciplines. The problem with this strategy is, however, 
that the individuation question is the question in which the issue of boundaries oc-
                                           
3 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 2nd edition of the Reine Rechtslehre, trans. M. Knight, Berkley: 
University of California Press 1967, p. 30 (quoted in FLG, p. 17).  
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cupies central stage. The strategy of FLG is to shift theoretical attention to the in-
dividuation question, yet in a way that deconstructs the very distinction between 
the identity and individuation questions. On the one hand, FLG argues that the 
very concept of law, which is traditionally aligned with the identity question, im-
plies a bounded first-person plural perspective, hence an internal connection be-
tween legal order and boundaries. On the other hand, FLG argues that acknowl-
edging this internal connection offers a privileged position from which to engage in 
the debate about the normativity of legal orders because what sparks this debate 
is, most fundamentally, the contestation and authoritative positing of legal 
boundaries: who ought to do what, where, and when? So, by focusing on the indi-
viduation question, FLG not only aspires to engage the entire spectrum of the con-
ceptual and normative debate spawned by the so-called identity question, not least 
with regard to globalization processes, but to do so in a way that opens up legal 
theory to the broader, and to my mind absolutely fundamental, debate between 
philosophies of identity and difference. Indeed, one of the unfortunate aspects of 
the distinction between questions of “identity” and “individuation” is that it con-
ceals the fact that the problem of collective identity and difference is at the very 
heart of “individuation.” And it is in the framework of this fundamental debate 
that a theory of legal ordering displays its properly political dimension: a politics of 
boundaries. 
 
FM: Following from what you have just pointed out in the final part of your 
answer, it seems to me that for a right understanding of your legal theory and 
comprehensive capturing of its implications, it is crucial to grasp, in the first place, 
the precise terms in which you conceive of the configuration of collective identity 
as the very “engine” – if you allow me the term – of legal order. I adopt here the 
expression “configuration of collective identity” as a general characterization of a 
high articulated and multi-faceted theoretical entity in your discourse, which calls 
for a closer inspection. There are indeed several dimensions simultaneously opera-
tive in your conception of collective identity which – I believe – are decisive for a 
thorough apprehension of the way you articulate legal order. 
 Let’s start with what I would call the structural dimension: how are we to ac-
curately understand “collective identity”, taking into account the by no means ev-
ident connection between “collective” and “identity”? To answer this question, 
you make – as far as I can see – a precise theoretical choice, drawing both on a cer-
tain analytical tradition and on a determinate phenomenological discourse. More 
precisely, on the one hand, mainly through your (critical) appropriation of Marga-
ret Gilbert’s theory of joint action,4 you illustrate in which way a putative We has 
to be conceived of if one wants to really maintain it as a collective identity. And 
here you particularly stress the pivotal differentiation between We-each and We-
                                           
4 Cf M. Gilbert, On Social Facts, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992. 
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together, seeing in the latter the appropriate configuration of collective identity. 
On the other hand, however, you also appeal to Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of the 
Self,5 and, by building on his bi-partition of “selfhood” and “sameness”, you show 
how the identity of a collective is a considerably more complex phenomenon than 
many analytical discourses have grasped (with their insufficiently  developed sen-
sibility for the ways in which difference constitutively intervenes within the sphere 
of identity). The interconnection of these two strands of thought – in their affini-
ties and differences – plays a determinant role in the construction of your theory. 
Given its crucial role, could you better delineate this point?              
 
HL: I indeed draw on theories of collective action and phenomenology when 
attempting to make sense of collective identity and its contrasting terms. Let me 
begin with identity. Ricoeur’s book, Soi-même comme un autre, is one of the very 
few works that provides a careful philosophical account and description of this 
term. What is of crucial importance is that he distinguishes between two poles (ra-
ther than forms) of identity: identity as sameness and as selfhood. Sameness speaks 
to numerical or qualitative dimensions of identity, predicated of whatever can be 
re-identified as remaining one and the same through time (e.g. a piece of pie, a 
cloud, a bird, a person, a soccer team, a state), and which Ricoeur contrasts to plu-
rality and difference, respectively. Selfhood, on the other hand, refers to a reflexive 
dimension of identity, whereby an individual views her or himself in the first-
person perspective as having certain beliefs and desires, and as the one who acts or 
doesn’t act. Ricoeur contrasts selfhood to other-than-self: autrui. 
While I take my point of departure in this rich account of identity, I expand it 
in two directions, neither of which is really addressed by Ricoeur. The first con-
cerns the extension of these two poles of identity to collectives or “plural subjects,” 
to use Margaret Gilbert’s wonderful expression. Indeed, theories of collective ac-
tion of analytical provenance have made a compelling argument to the effect that 
there is a distinctive first-person plural perspective proper to collective agency, a 
perspective which is not simply the summation of the first-person singular perspec-
tives of the individuals who compose the group. While there can be no first-person 
plural perspective absent a plurality of individuals, and in that sense absent a 
manifold of first-person singular perspectives, the former is not simply an aggrega-
tion of the latter. This means, concretely, that judgments, intentions, actions, and 
responsibility can meaningfully be ascribed to social groups, which groups have an 
existence irreducible to—although not independent of—the individuals which 
compose them. The second extension of Ricoeur’s theory of identity concerns the 
problem and the experience of the strange. As Waldenfels has correctly pointed 
out, a remarkable feature of Ricoeur’s theory of identity is that, when contrasting 
selfhood to other-than-self, the French phenomenologist passes over in silence the 
                                           
5 Cf P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. K. Blamey, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1992. 
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specific mode of encounter with other-than-self in which the latter manifests itself 
as what is strange to self. Introducing strangeness and the stranger into a theory of 
collective identity is crucial to FLG because it permits thematising the problem of 
a-legality, as the specifically legal mode of appearance of the strange, and doing so 
in a way that resists Ricoeur’s dialectical interpretation of the encounter between 
self and other-than-self.       
 
FM: The other dimension I would like to inspect in your conception of collec-
tive identity is the dynamical one. Any putative We intended as a legal order is, in 
fact, by no means an ossified and monolithic entity. And this is because, far from 
relying on (and merely repeating) a pre-established substantive foundation capable 
of determining and giving full unitary form to it, it has as its only grounding pos-
sibility the very process of its own political and contingent constitution. As a con-
sequence of this – borrowing Claude Lefort’s terminology –, any ordered or insti-
tuted We is and will always remain dynamical and never fully determined because 
it is none other than the result of its self-institution – i.e. of the instituting We – 
deprived of any ontological guarantee.6  
Addressing this dynamical dimension, which embraces the relation institut-
ed/instituting, has enormous repercussions in your analysis of legal order. You 
clearly notice, for instance, how it implies a radical reformulation of one of the 
classical topoi of constitutional theory: constituent power. To this respect you af-
firm, in effect, that neither a foundationalist perspective – not even a formalistic 
one based on an original norm, like the one endorsed by Kelsen –, nor a 
decisionistic stance, like the one defended by Schmitt, offers a really satisfactory 
appraisal of the dynamic inhering in constituent power. In your view, it is rather a 
certain phenomenological re-appropriation of the concept of representation  which 
offers the real possibility of moving beyond the inadequate extremes of a radical 
originalism, according to which constituted  power becomes a “pure repetition” of 
a pre-supposed original constituent power (FLG, p. 151), and a radical constructiv-
ism, according to which constituent power is productive of a “pure novelty” inevi-
tably caught by arbitrariness. In particular, the structure of representation you 
deploy – and you have developed through a long journey of phenomenological de-
bating with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of creative expression, Derrida’s notion of 
the supplementarity of origin and Waldenfels’s logic of responsiveness7 – shows 
                                           
6 Cf C. Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Macey, Cambridge: Polity Press 1988, 
esp. pp. 19 ff. 
7 I refer here, for instance, to your works: “Acquiring a Community: the Acquis and the Institu-
tion of European Legal Order”, in European Law Journal 9, 2003, pp. 433-450; “Give and Take: 
Arendt and the Nomos of Political Community”, in Philosophy and Social Criticism 32, 2006, pp. 
461-484; “The Paradox of Constituent Power. The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European 
Union”, in Ratio Juris 20, 2007, pp. 485-505; and “Constituten Power and Reflexive Identity: 
Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood”, in M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.), The Paradox 
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how constituent power is inevitably articulated by a kind of paradox which es-
capes both ends of the aforementioned alternative: a putative We is not originally 
present to itself and subsequently  represents itself to itself (vs. originalism), but 
rather, by being deprived of any kind of pre-available origin,8 it constitutes itself 
as what it is only by a successful – i.e. collectively accepted – process of represent-
ing its own origin (vs. constructivism). As you put it: “Representation has a para-
doxical structure because an act can only originate a community by representing its 
origin. Everything begins with a re-presentation. More precisely, an act can only 
originate a collective if it succeeds – and as long as it succeeds – in representing an 
original collective” (FLG, p. 150).  
This kind of understanding of the process of constituent power as originating 
representation, you propose, also shows its paradoxical configuration in its tem-
poral articulation. In fact, given the premises you lay down, one can no longer hold 
either that constituent power is a pure prius (presentation), which the constituted 
order follows as a mere posterius (re-presentation), or that it is a potentiality simp-
ly awaiting its unfolding realization (cf FLG, p. 213). On the contrary, drawing 
from a long tradition that goes back to Freud’s paradoxical temporality of an 
originary Nachträglichkeit of trauma and to its Derridian reprise as a supplement de 
l’origine, and relying on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘a past which has never been 
present’ and on its Waldenfelsian re-actualization in terms of a vorgängige 
Nachträglichkeit of response, you clearly display how the instituting power of rep-
resentation shows its effects only post festum, après coup, thereby obeying the par-
adoxical logic of an original “retroactivity” of constitution or – more precisely – of 
an instituting articulation as an “anticipat[ion] by reiterat[ion]” (FLG, p. 150). 
The way in which you configure the above mentioned dimensions – the struc-
tural, the dynamical, and the temporal – brings quite a bit of novelty into the field 
of legal studies. I would like to ask you whether you feel as an Einzelgänger in this 
line of work or you currently see other good companions going in the same direc-
tion.   
Secondly, I would like to get back to your radical notion of representation and 
point out how, if we take it in its genealogical articulation, it may produce a sort of 
inner discrepancy in your own discourse structure. Indeed, if we start from the 
premise that only a representational act is able to enact the institution of a collec-
tive – which is originally deprived of any kind of original self-identity –, then this 
means that the exclusive source for the very performing of such an act of a (possi-
bly) viable constitution of the common is none other than the initiative of repre-
sentative individuals. As you too in many places observe, this goes back to the rad-
                                                                                                                                               
of Constituent Power: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2007, pp. 9-24.  
8 As you precisely recall it: “A collective is never present to itself as its own foundation” (FLG, p. 
150). 
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ical phenomenological fact that – quoting Waldenfels – “no We [can ever] say ‘we’, 
but rather I say ‘we’ or another says ‘we’, […] it is every time an individual who 
speaks for others. The We needs a spokesperson who represents the group”.9 But, if 
this is true, then, what emerges at the very core of collective identity is what I call 
elsewhere the constitutive intervention (and excess) of “singularity”.10 Now, trans-
posing this state of affairs into your terminology, I would dare to say: no We-
together can ever cover over the originary representative enactment performed by 
singularity; and more importantly: no We-together can ever conceal its genealogi-
cal contamination with the We-each, in which primarily singularity has to be lo-
cated. This is exactly what I find problematic in your strong differentiation be-
tween We-together and We-each, by putting most of the theoretical weight in the 
former and only cursorily addressing the potentiality of the latter. By doing this, I 
have the impression you concede, at the end of the day, no proper structural space 
for what is most important for your discourse, too: the very place of insurgence of 
any act of formative representation embodied in singularity. 
 
HL: I don’t feel like an Einzelgänger in working out the implications of the 
paradox of representation for the theory of constituent power, quite simply be-
cause, as you note, I ride piggy-back on the work that has been done by others in 
this field, most notably Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and Waldenfels, but also legal 
philosophers such as Bert van Roermund, my close colleague at Tilburg. I claim 
little or no originality for this aspect of FLG; where FLG does, perhaps, carry fur-
ther earlier analyses of the paradox of representation is in its account of how the 
paradox plays itself out in terms of the acts of setting legal boundaries. Now, as 
concerns the distinction between We-together and We-each, it seems to me that 
your critique is spot-on: the very logic of the argument I am making concerning 
the representational emergence of a legal collective entails that it is impossible to 
entirely disentangle We-together and We-each from each other. In particular, I 
should have made more of the insight that plurality, in the strong Arendtian sense 
of the term, is irreducible to plurality in Gilbert’s sense of “plural subjectivity.”  
I would want to add, however, that singularity is not exhausted by acts of 
formative representation. There is also singularity in the form of refusal, for which 
Bartleby’s “I’d prefer not to” is paradigmatic. This is a form of singularity that is 
“de-surgent” and “de-presentational,” if I can put it that way, as opposed to being 
insurgent and representational, inasmuch as it interrupts collective action without 
                                           
9 B. Waldenfels, Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 
2006, p. 122. 
10 I allow myself, in this context, to refer to my works: F.G. Menga, “The Seduction of Radical 
Democracy. Deconstructing Hannah Arendt’s Political Discourse”, in Constellations 21, 3, 2014, 
esp. pp. 320 ff. and Potere costituente e rappresentanza democratica. Per una fenomenologia dello 
spazio istituzionale, Naples: Editoriale Scientifica 2010, esp. pp. 281 ff. 
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intimating other possibilities for legal ordering. Perhaps singularity, so described, 
lies beyond a-legality as characterized in FLG. Finally, the insurgence, as you nice-
ly put it, of a representational claim highlights another idea which is only men-
tioned in passing in FLG, namely, that a group is an Us before it is a We. Indeed, 
the ascription of an act to a collective entails that it is impossible to completely 
disentangle a We, as the subject which acts, from the group which is the object of 
an ascriptive act: an Us. There is, accordingly, always an irreducible ambiguity 
that attaches to collective self-constitution, which is both the constitution of a col-
lective self and constitution by a collective self. Raimo Tuomela has written a book 
on collective action entitled The Importance of Us;11 how apposite the title, even 
though in a sense not envisaged by the author! Acknowledging this point makes 
room for interpreting the emergence of a legal collective and its boundaries as an 
event, and not merely as the act of a subject. In fact, acknowledging this point 
leads to a certain undecidability as to whether a boundary “belongs” to a We or 
whether it “belongs” to whom/what interpellates a manifold of individuals as a col-
lective. 
 
FM: You are right in noting that representation does not exhaust the entire 
spectrum of singularity. There are indeed – as you well mention – quite a few in-
stances in which singularity shows its de-presentational and de-surgent configura-
tion. Giorgio Agamben, in particular, has insisted on granting political articulation 
exactly to such versions of singularity, such that the political discourse should no 
longer think, for instance, only in terms of constituent power, but also in terms of 
forms of de-stituent power. However, in my opinion, it is exactly such a purported 
political configuration of de-representing instances which remain inevitably ex-
cluded or unrealizable. And this also explains the reason why I have connected 
singularity solely with its formative figuration. To be sure, I do not exclude – as 
the case of Bartleby, The Scrivener clearly illustrates – that there might be de-
surgent emergencies of singularity within the political realm. What I exclude, in-
stead, is the fact that such de-surgent instantiations of singularity may really ac-
quire – and stabilize themselves in – a true and proper political articulation with-
out an even minimal representational projection or élan. Hence, if we go beyond 
the rhetoric that lends sustenance to these instances and their alleged political con-
figuration, I believe we are left with the following state of affairs: insofar as de-
presentational instantiations of singularity really want to act within the political 
realm –  even if in the form of a minimal resistance, protest or refusal –, they need 
to articulate a claim and, accordingly, initiate a representational process, thereby 
inevitably transgressing their initially intended aspiration to absolute irrelation. 
And from this perspective, I think, we can stress the Bartleby example even fur-
                                           
11 Cf R. Tuomela, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 1995.  
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ther, by not forgetting, firstly, the way in which the story ends: Bartleby wastes 
away, collapsing under the weight of his own irrelation; and, secondly, the by no 
means secondary fact for a political articulation that Melville, by assigning the 
narration of the story to the lawyer who hires Bartleby, never concedes to Bartle-
by himself the authorship of his own discourse or purported paradoxical (non-
)claim (to irrelationality).   
All of these elements lead me to downplay the significance of the alleged politi-
cal role that instances of de-surgent singularity may actually acquire. And by the 
same token, they encourage me to emphasize the importance of your comment, in 
passing, that such de-presentational forms of singularity may lie beyond the reach 
of a-legality. This aside of yours is extremely significant to me, for I read it as your 
own way of not granting the aforementioned instances of de-presenting singularity 
full politico-legal status. Would you agree on this conclusion?  
 
HL: Yes! I think that to the extent that Bartleby goes no further than saying 
“no,” there is no normative claim which is raised, no reference to what Lefort 
would call an outside—a dehors—from which a manifold of individuals can under-
stand themselves as a unity, in and through their multiple divisions. This capacity 
to refer to an outside whence a manifold of individuals can view themselves as a 
group is nothing other than the capacity to represent, which is another way of say-
ing that while there is of course an institutional dimension of representation which 
partakes of what Lefort calls “politics” (la politique), representation, in its funda-
mental sense, is connected to “the political” (le politique). It is this fundamental 
sense of representation which is at stake in the “a” of a-legality. 
Abstracting from cases of singular refusals à la Bartleby, at issue is the critique 
which would uncouple the insurgency of constituent power from representation. 
Negri is only one of the many authors who follow this line of approach. The diffi-
culties encountered by this critique of political representation are particularly 
manifest in the Charter of Principles of the World Social Forum. The sixth princi-
ple of the Charter states that “No one . . . will be authorized, on behalf of any of 
the editions of the Forum, to express positions claiming to be those of all its partic-
ipants.” In other words, the Charter proscribes political representation from the 
WSF. This is consistent with how the Charter portrays the WSF, namely, as an 
“open meeting place for reflection,” although one may ask whether the Charter it-
self is not a representative act that assigns the WSF a purpose that includes and 
excludes in the very process of claiming to be open. But even if one takes the Char-
ter at face value, it neatly discloses why it will not work to disconnect constituent 
power from representation: a space remains open only if no representational claim 
is made in the name of a whole; but without such a claim, no alternative political 
and legal order can be founded, by revolutionary means or otherwise. The price of 
“radical openness” in politics is the loss of constituent power. For revolt is a 
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conditio sine qua non but not the conditio per quam of revolution. Unless the multi-
tude is represented as a unity in action, no political community can be constituted. 
 
FM: Let’s get back to the final part of your previous answer, in which you 
mention what is probably the most crucial theme of your book: the relation of le-
gal order to its constitutive boundedness. To say that any imaginable order is inev-
itably bounded implies in your discourse to adhere to its ontological character of 
contingency and, accordingly, to its constitutive relation with an exteriority as 
that which constantly embodies the mark of the order’s limitedness by questioning 
the extant configuration or delimitation thereof. In more simple terms, the 
boundedness of an order means that if the order is so, it could have been otherwise, 
whereby this “otherwise” is constantly incorporated by the always possible emer-
gent demands for its reconfiguration. Now, what has captured my attention was 
primarily your precise methodological choice in articulating such a dynamic of in-
teriority/exteriority, identity/alterity, boundary-setting/boundary-questioning, in-
clusion/exclusion that inheres in order. In fact, to illustrate its contingent charac-
ter and its relatedness to the outside, you draw on a philosophy of otherness or 
strangerhood, which is mainly – even if not exclusively – inspired by Waldenfels’s 
phenomenology of the strange(r), instead of relying on more broadly deployed par-
adigms in this field of politico-legal studies, such as Luhmann’s system theory, 
Habermas’s communication pragmatism or even Gadamer’s hermeneutics of 
factical contexts. And by doing this, it seems to me that you follow him also in his 
opinion that the  alternative paradigms mentioned heretofore, though initially cel-
ebrating the contingent character of order and the necessity of its constitutive rela-
tion to otherness, nevertheless display a deeper absolutistic aspiration which ends 
up aiming to overcome any limitedness and alterity. As far as systems theory is 
concerned, you display your critical distance to it, for instance, when you address 
its reactualization by Teubner’s work.12 And, in this context, you exactly highlight 
his shortcomings in underplaying the insuperability of order’s limits. As to your 
critique of communicative liberalism, you devote long parts of your book to show-
ing how a clear tendency to the reduction of strangeness to alterity is at work in 
both Habermas’s13 and Benhabib’s philosophies of universalism.14 Similarly, your 
                                           
12 Cf esp. G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2011. 
13 Cf J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, trans. M. Pensky, Cambridge: Polity Press 
2001; Id., Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, trans. C. Cronin and P. de Greiff, 
Cambridge: Polity Press 2005; Id., The Divided West, trans. C. Ciaran, Cambridge: Polity Press 
2006.  
14 Cf S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. 
A-Legality: Journey to the Borders of Law. In Dialogue with Hans Lindahl 
 
933 
 
critique of Gadamer15 is no lighter, as you reproach him for a kind of final dialecti-
cal absorption into an order of its limited character in the face of strangeness.    
Given the importance of these points, I would invite you to deliver a more 
comprehensive comment on your methodological choice, perhaps by shortly re-
addressing one by one your main critiques of your opponents. 
 
HL: Let me begin with systems theory, which most explicitly forefronts the in-
ternal connection between boundaries and systems in general, and legal systems in 
particular. After all, the boundary between a legal system and its environment is, 
as both Luhmann and Teubner never cease to remind us, constitutive for the pos-
sibility of law as a system. Yet despite its insistence on the constitutive signifi-
cance of boundaries for legal systems, systems theory denies that a spatial bounda-
ry is constitutive thereof. This is already the case in Luhmann; it is much more ex-
plicitly the case in Teubner, who claims that global legal orders are organized in 
terms of the legal/illegal code, and in that functional sense remain bounded, yet 
cease to be bounded in terms of the spatial distinction between inside and outside. 
This allows him to defend what I have called “functional universalism.”16 Like 
other forms of universalism, so also systems theory takes for granted that the in-
side/outside distinction is contingent because it amounts to the distinction between 
the domestic and the foreign. 
The main thrust of FLG is to show that the distinction between the own and 
the strange is more fundamental than that between the domestic and the foreign, 
hence that any and all forms of global law are spatially bounded in this fundamen-
tal sense. Recovering this fundamental sense of the inside/outside distinction re-
quires, however, relinquishing the systemic understanding of reflexivity as devel-
oped by Luhmann and Teubner: the self of collective self-identification is not the 
autos of autopoeisis: the former involves the first-person perspective of an embodied 
agent, which is, of course, what Luhmann and Teubner have been concerned to 
purge from systems theory by dint of their methodological decision to forefront 
communication as the elemental unit of a system.  
In contrast to systems theory, both particularistic and universalistic accounts 
of legal order and legal ordering hold on to the first person perspectives of individ-
ual and collective agency. But their approaches to the relation between boundaries 
and legal orders are also reductive. Particularism’s simple account of boundaries, 
whereby boundaries include and exclude, has its counterpart in a simple account of 
collective identity: the closure that gives rise to a polity involves a self-inclusion 
and other-exclusion. When the boundaries between a We and other-than-We are 
                                           
15 Cf H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd revised edition trans. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Mar-
shall, London and New York: Continuum 2004. 
16 Cf H. Lindahl, “We and Cyberlaw: the Spatial Unity of Constitutional Orders,” in Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 20, 2, 2013, pp. 697-730. 
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contested, the polity’s members reaffirm their joint identity by establishing among 
themselves how those boundaries should be posited.  Against particularism, uni-
versalism correctly argues that the boundaries of a polity don’t merely separate it 
from the rest of the world; they also include it in a common world. This more com-
plex approach, whereby boundaries include what they exclude, entails an expan-
sive concept of identity. When the boundaries between We and other-than-We are 
contested, the affirmation of a polity’s identity demands the inclusion of the ex-
cluded other. To my mind, neither of these accounts comes to terms with the irre-
ducible contingency of boundaries. Particularism assumes that when the bounda-
ries between We and other-than-We are contested, the polity’s members are to pre-
serve an original identity that differentiates We from other-than-We. Yet identity 
emerges through representational acts of inclusion and exclusion that, representing 
a We as this We’, hence not as that We’, differentiate We from other-than-We and 
from itself, thereby introducing difference in the identity of We. Boundary-setting 
isn’t the recovery and reaffirmation of an original collective identity as the touch-
stone for how boundaries ought to be drawn. Universalism, for its part, argues that, 
albeit within a narrow normative scope, an all-inclusive global polity is possible 
and ought to be realized by progressively including what has been excluded. But 
boundary-setting also introduces difference into other-than-We: to include the 
other, a politics of boundaries must frame its challenge in terms of the challenge to 
which the polity can respond by reaffirming its identity: How ought we to posit our 
boundaries? So, while polities, including a global polity of some sort, can certainly 
become more inclusive because their boundaries include what they exclude, their 
boundaries also exclude what they include, thereby precluding that the terminus 
of boundary-setting can be a polity that has an inside but no outside. In contrast 
to both particularism and universalism, FLG defends the idea that boundaries are 
and will remain irreducibly contingent because of the complex logic of boundaries, 
which include what they exclude and exclude what they include. 
The argument about the complex logic of boundaries can also be presented as 
an argument about identity and difference. In effect, the core argument advanced 
by FLG as to why the inside/outside distinction is constitutive for legal orders, 
hence why all legal boundaries are irreducibly contingent, can be summarized in 
the following general proposition: To posit the boundaries that include a polity We 
and exclude other-than-We is to represent We as this or as that We’, and other-
than-We as this or that other-than-We’, thereby introducing difference into iden-
tity. 
 
FM: Still! What about your critical stance as regards Gadamerian hermeneu-
tics? I am particularly interested in this, since you seem to maintain quite a – lit-
erally – ambivalent position towards it: on the one hand, you draw some impor-
tant features from it – and more pointedly from its Heideggerian matrix – in the 
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process of substantiating your illustration of the contingency-based configuration 
of legal order (cf FLG, pp. 23, 122 ff); on the other, you nevertheless detect in it an 
absolutistic-dialectical inclusive aspiration when dealing with strange-
ness/otherness – especially in the wake of a “fusion of horizons”17 (cf FLG, pp. 211, 
234, and esp. 266). Could you be more explicit on this point? 
 
HL: As is well known, Gadamer’s analysis of dialogue is governed by the dis-
tinction between the familiar and the strange. According to Gadamer, dialogue is 
sparked by misunderstanding, by the experience of what is strange, of what resists 
integration into the horizon of our expectations. Dialogue, as an exemplary mani-
festation of the hermeneutic endeavour, plays itself out in the polarity between 
“strangeness and familiarity.”18 And, Gadamer adds, “the true locus of hermeneu-
tics is this in-between” (ibid). The hermeneutic “in-between” (Zwischen) is, of 
course, none other than the “dia” of “dialogue.” Gadamer develops the dialogical 
notion of the interaction between self and other through a phenomenology of the 
game (Spiel). “Whatever is brought into play or comes into play no longer depends 
on itself but is dominated by the relation that we call the game.’”19 This back and 
forth movement, which is constitutive for a game, determines intersubjectivity as 
the dialectical mediation of the familiar and the strange. The outcome of a dia-
logue between self and other, in this strong sense of the term “dialogue,” is a 
higher-order unity if things go well, that is, a unity that encompasses both self and 
other in a situation of mutual understanding. So, paradoxically, the Gadamerian 
dialogue realizes its most intimate finality if it effaces itself as a dia-logue. In other 
words, the “in-between” separating self and other, the familiar and the strange, is 
provisional, even if the self is ever vulnerable to novel experiences of strangeness 
that call for renewed dialogue. See here the core idea governing the notion of a “fu-
sion of horizons.” 
The assumption that this conception of dialogue, interpreted as the symmetri-
cal movement in which the engagement of the other by the self is correlative to the 
engagement of the self by the other, is at work in a politics of boundaries is to my 
mind highly problematic. The problem is not so much that the exercise of political 
power belies the ‘levity’ of a game, for, as Gadamer points out, games can be 
played with extraordinary seriousness.20 The problem is, rather, that games and 
dialogues, as described by Gadamer, presuppose a symmetric relation between the 
parties thereto. But a politics of boundaries displays a double asymmetry, or so I 
argue. On the one hand, the strange, in the strong sense of the term, is asymmetri-
                                           
17 H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, esp. pp. 305 f. 
18 Ibid., p. 295. 
19 H.G. Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding,” in Id., Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
trans. and ed. D. Linge, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976, p. 53. 
20 H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 101ff. 
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cal in that it is what resists integration into the Gadamerian dialectic of the self 
and other.  On the other, while the exercise of political power can, up to a point, 
take on a dialogical form, it is also—and necessarily—the limit of a dialogue be-
tween self and other, by virtue of both enabling and disabling it. If the political re-
lation between a collective self and its others is at all dialogical, then certainly not 
in the form of Gadamer’s “infinite dialogue,” an understanding of a dialogue that 
is, incidentally, very close to the notion of discourse defended by Habermas. Dia-
logues in the course of legal ordering are perforce limited dialogues, in this twofold 
sense of the term “limit.”21 
 
FM: I can well imagine a line of critical remarks as to the contingency and ir-
reducible boundedness of legal orders which concerns your topos of a-legality, ar-
ticulating the unavoidable alterability of orders. Following your depiction, a-
legality provokes a transformative politics of legal boundaries in two manners ac-
cording to the intensity of transgression which is called into place. A-legality may 
refer to a “weak dimension” (FLG, p. 164) when a still unordered normative claim 
is raised and, consequently, order is called to re-configure itself in an extensive 
way, so as to grant legal inclusion to that claim. In such a scenario, a-legality gives 
rise to the experience of an order’s “limits” and to the possibility of re-setting its 
legal boundaries (FLG, p. 174). To sum up with your words: such a dimension of 
weak a-legality, which engenders the experience of limits, “evokes a form of unor-
dered orderability” (FLG, p. 167). A-legality however also has a “strong dimension” 
(FLG, p. 165), which takes place exactly when a still unordered normative claim is 
raised not as a call for inclusion within the order, but rather as demanding exclu-
sion therefrom. We are dealing here with instances – like secession attempts or rev-
olutionary outbursts – in which legal order does not experience its limit as a limit 
which could be shifted, but rather as an irreducible and non-includable “fault 
line.” As you precisely put it: “if, in its weak dimension, a-legality denotes a nor-
mative claim to the extent it is unordered but orderable, in its strong dimension it 
denotes this claim to the extent that it is unordered and unorderable” (FLG, p. 165). 
And this inevitably leads – as you follow – to the unbridgeable “difference between 
the modes of appearance of a limit and of a fault line. Whereas limits bespeak a 
gap between extant legal empowerments and those practical possibilities which are 
unrealized but realizable by the collective, normative fault lines mark the gap be-
tween the practical possibilities accessible to a collective and practical possibilities 
which are inaccessible to it” (FLG, p. 176). Cut to the bone: “The distinctive fea-
                                           
21 These ideas are developed at far greater length in my articles “Democracy, Political Reflexivi-
ty and Bounded Dialogues: Reconsidering the Monism-Pluralism Debate,” in E. Christodoulidis 
and S. Tierney (eds.), Public Law and Politics, Aldershot: Ashgate 2008, pp. 103-116, and “Dia-
lectic and Revolution: Confronting Kelsen and Gadamer on Legal Interpretation,” in Cardozo 
Law Review 24, 2, 2003, pp. 769-798.  
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ture of fault lines is that, unlike limits, they cannot be shifted; they must be over-
stepped, and in being overstepped lead over from one legal collective to another” 
(FLG, p. 175). 
Now, with regard to this crucial bi-partition you make, my remark is very 
simple: if one can envisage a quite imaginable legal practicability for order in cases 
of weak a-legality, not as imaginable is the possible transformative legal articula-
tion for instances of strong a-legality. In effect, one could raise the following ques-
tions: Doesn’t indeed a fault line, whenever it emerges, inevitably embody – to 
borrow Chantal Mouffe’s terminology – an “antagonistic”22 claim so strong and ir-
reconcilable that it cannot be dealt by any legal order? Doesn’t instead such a 
claim, in order to be legally addressed, need be “sublimated” in terms of a viable 
“agonistic” conflict, and by doing this we are however immediately re-located 
within the semantic area of a weak form of a-legality? And at last: Doesn’t a fault 
line more than a legally addressable moment represent the blind spot of the legal as 
such, a région sauvage of law which can be played out only in terms of “the politi-
cal”?  
 
HL: This is precisely the objection that Mouffe herself has addressed to me, 
during a wonderful discussion of a preliminary draft of the book at Westminster! 
My answer, albeit an answer I could only articulate well after the discussion, found 
its way into Section 7.5 of  FLG. After all, if the outside is the domain to which a 
collective has no normative access if it is to pursue joint action under law, how can 
this domain be the object of legal boundary-setting? To put it in Mouffe’s vocabu-
lary, antagonism must be transformed into an agonistic politics, which is simply 
another name for an internal politics of boundaries oriented to dealing with the 
weak dimension of a-legality. I concur with this point, which is exactly why I have 
been concerned to argue that boundaries manifest themselves as limits, hence as 
transformable in the framework of an agonistic politics. I wonder, however, 
whether the distinction between agonism and antagonism exhausts the scope of a 
politics of boundaries, that is, whether the experience of a boundary as a fault line 
is only antagonistic. It seems to me that by contrasting antagonism to agonism, 
Mouffe too quickly follows Schmitt’s assimilation of strangeness to enmity,23 hence 
his assumption that strangeness entails “the negation of one’s own form of exis-
tence and therefore must be repulsed or fought to preserve one’s own extant form 
of life.”24 I concede that enmity is one of the modes of manifestation of the strange, 
and that antagonism is part and parcel of the concept of the political. But I would 
argue, against Schmitt and against Mouffe, that enmity does not exhaust the phe-
                                           
22 Cf Ch. Mouffe, On the Political, London and New York: Routledge 2005, esp. chap. 2. 
23 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, trans. G. Schwab et al., Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press 2007, p. 27. 
24 Ibid. 
FERDINANDO G. MENGA 
 
938 
 
nomenon of the strange. First and foremost, the strange, as concerns the strong 
dimension of a-legality, manifests itself in the form of an exception, that is, as an 
excessive normative claim which resists inclusion both as legal and as illegal—
indeed as a région sauvage which accompanies every legal order as its shadow. As I 
argue and illustrate in FLG, this excessive normative claim interferes with the re-
alisation of the collective’s normative point. But the interference wrought by a-
legality is not eo ipse an existential threat to a legal collective. In other words, the 
strange opens up a space for a politics of boundaries that is not antagonistic. It 
speaks to a politics of the exception in a sense of the term which is precisely the 
opposite to that envisaged by Schmitt: a form of collective self-restraint in the 
form of exceptional measures, that is, measures that suspend the application of the 
law with a view to preserving the strange as strange. So defined, a politics of the 
exception is complementary to agonistic politics, yet not antagonistic. It is precisely 
what I have in mind when arguing that a politics of boundary is not only a “reach-
ing out to bring in” but also a “holding back to hold out.”   
 
FM: After having addressed and discussed – as far as an introductory interlo-
cution permits – the main trajectories of your work, I would like to proceed with a 
concluding issue. I am interested in hearing whether – one year on after the publi-
cation of your book and several discussion events devoted to it – you feel there are 
parts of your theory you would now expand, integrate, or even formulate different-
ly. 
 
HL: Looking backward, perhaps the most important conceptual task I need to 
address is to elaborate much more fully on the connection between what I call the 
weak and the strong dimensions of a-legality. This connection is crucial to the cen-
tral thesis of the book, namely, that a-legality is a distinctive category which man-
ifests itself from a first-person plural perspective and which should not be collapsed 
into (il)legality. Looking forward, the final chapter of the book, which is straight-
forwardly normative in its approach, requires further development in a number of 
directions, as the comments by several of the respondents make massively clear. 
One aspect which they don’t mention, yet which has emerged in my previous dis-
cussions with you, concerns the alternative justification of human rights proposed 
in that chapter. I would agree, in hindsight, that it would be worthwhile exploring 
the possibility of more firmly linking a justification of human rights to singular 
manifestations of formative representation. I hope to develop this justification in 
the near future. 
 
FM: A very last word harking back to the very first word appearing in the cov-
er of your book: Fault Lines (… of Globalization). Closely adhering to the approach 
you propose – and drawing further reinforcement from Bakhtin’s and Borges’s les-
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son – we may well say that every dia-logue, if thoroughly understood, implies al-
ways a polylogue. In other words, while speaking to others we are also constantly – 
and perhaps even more primarily – spoken by others. Exactly in these terms I 
would like to define the instantaneous striking impression which popped up in my 
mind when first reading the title of your book. I made indeed an immediate con-
nection to the incipit of another book’s title which recites: Bruchlinien (… der 
Erfahrung). Now, knowing how much inspiration you draw from the phenomeno-
logical thrust of its author, the German philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels,25 I dare 
to say that such a polylogical impression of mine was not just the result of the 
mere projection of my own daimones on your discourse. Am I right, then, in grasp-
ing a certain ‘air of familiarity’ – or more precisely ‘strangeness’ – between your 
Fault Lines and Waldenfels’s Bruchlinien?  
Under condition I am not simply equivocating here, then I would like to think 
that your book, from its very beginning, is primarily the emblematic instance em-
bodying the same estrangement logic it advocates. In other terms, your book as 
the very first place in which the trace of the stranger irreducibly contaminates the 
own; the place in which the erstes Wort [first word] already is – nachträglich, après 
coup – an Ant-Wort [answer]. 
 
HL: Yes; I could not formulate this more eloquently than you have.  
 
FM: Professor Lindahl, thank you very much for your kind partaking in this 
dia-logos.  
 
HL: It hasn’t ended!                   
 
 
                                           
25 B. Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. Phänomenologie – Psychoanalyse – 
Phänomenotechnik, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 2002. 
